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According to strong immanent realism, proposed for instance by 
David M. Armstrong, universals are concrete, located in their 
instances. E.J. Lowe and Douglas Ehring have presented 
arguments to the effect that strong immanent realism is incoherent. 
Cody Gilmore has defended strong immanent realism against the 
charge of incoherence. Gilmore’s argument has thus far remained 
unanswered. We argue that Gilmore’s response to the charge of 
incoherence is an ad hoc move without support independent of 
strong immanent realism itself. We conclude that strong immanent 
realism remains under the threat of incoherence posed by Lowe 
and Ehring. !
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1. Introduction!
In Universals and Scientific Realism, David M. Armstrong (1978a, b) 
rehabilitated realism about universals as a viable metaphysical position. 
Instead of taking universals as abstract entities, he had the agenda of 
“bringing them down to earth” (1989, 76-77, 99-100). Accordingly, 
Armstrong and others have construed universals as concrete constituents 
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Immanent realism about universals claims that universals must have 
particular instances in order to exist.  E.J. Lowe (2006, 99) distinguishes 1
between strong and weak immanent realism. Lowe argues against 
Armstrong’s strong immanent realism, according to which universals are 
themselves concrete (spatiotemporal) and located where their instances 
are (Lowe 1998, 156). According to strong immanent realism (henceforth 
“SIR”), a universal can be simultaneously multi-located: one and the 
same non-scattered entity occupying different spatial locations at the 
same time. In contrast, the proponents of weak immanent realism (Ellis 
2001; Lowe 1998, 2006, 2009) maintain that all universals are abstract, 
i.e., non-spatiotemporal. Hence, according to weak immanent realism 
universals cannot occupy spatiotemporal locations. 
Douglas Ehring (2002) has also advanced an argument against SIR. Both 
Lowe’s and Ehring’s arguments against SIR take the form of reductio ad 
absurdum: they attempt to show that given certain plausible assumptions, 
SIR turns out to be incoherent. Ehring’s argument led Cody Gilmore 
(2003) to defend SIR by proposing a novel conception of the structure of 
spatial relations, “the 2n proposal”. Gilmore’s idea is that when we come 
to conceive of a spatial relation, say ‘x is two feet from y’ as four instead 
of two placed, Ehring’s critical conclusion will be avoided. And, while 
Gilmore addresses only Ehring’s discussion, his 2n proposal, if 
acceptable, would also work in countering Lowe’s criticism of SIR.  
Gilmore’s defence of SIR is, in turn, completely ignored in Lowe’s 
subsequent recap (2006, 99) of his argument against Armstrong. In the 
wake of Gilmore’s defence, Ehring subsequently gave in on the issue 
(e.g. 2011, 29-30). So, judging from the present state of the play, it seems 
that concrete universals are still a live option in metaphysics thanks to 
Gilmore’s defence. Indeed, SIR has been recently endorsed, for instance, 
by Katherine Hawley and Alexander Bird (2011, 207). 
In this paper, we argue that Gilmore’s 2n proposal goes virtually no way 
to answer Lowe’s and Ehring’s arguments against SIR. While the 2n 
proposal is in itself an interesting alternative to the usual common sense 
picture of the structure of spatial relations, in the present dialectical 
context it stands in need of rational support that is independent of SIR 
itself. We think Gilmore does not give us such independent grounds for 
replacing the common sense “n-place” view of the structure of spatial 
relations with the 2n view. Our main point is a negative one: in the 
present context, debate about the metaphysics of universals, Gilmore’s 2n 
proposal turns out to be purely ad hoc. 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 Immanent realism contrasts with transcendent realism, according to which a universal 1
can exist without being instantiated. Universals are seen either as Russellian property 
universals, i.e. properties instantiated directly by objects (e.g., Armstrong 1997), or as 
Neo-Aristotelian kind universals instantiated in objects or in tropes (Smith 1997; Lowe 
1998, 2009; Ellis 2001).
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In our view, since Gilmore’s answer to Lowe’s and Ehring’s arguments 
against SIR is not satisfactory, these critical arguments remain 
unanswered. Hence, SIR still faces the serious threat of incoherence. 
Unless some other answer to their critiques of SIR were developed, or the 
2n proposal provided with independent support, the current situation 
ought to lead us to consider other forms of realism, or nominalism, as the 
more attractive options in the universals debate. !
2. Lowe and Ehring against SIR !
Let us now take a closer look at Lowe’s and Ehring’s arguments against 
SIR. Both of these arguments have the form of a reductio ad absurdum: 
their aim is to show that given certain plausible assumptions SIR leads to 
a contradiction. First, we will briefly present each argument. After that, in 
order to make the target and scaope of these arguments more precise than 
in their original formulations, we will point out certain distinctions and 
background assumptions relevant to each argument. 
Lowe’s argument against SIR is part of his critique of Armstrong’s 
position (Lowe 1998, 156, cf. 2006, 99). It can be summarized as 
follows: Assume, for the sake of illustration, that there are two balls in 
disjoint spatiotemporal locations. Suppose further that both balls, as 
particular objects, instantiate a specific universal, say the property of 
impenetrability. According to SIR, the property of impenetrability is, to 
use the standard phrase, “wholly present” in each ball, located where 
each ball is located. Impenetrability is wholly present in each ball in the 
sense that we are not dealing with a scattered object located in a scattered 
region consisting of the locations of each ball. The point is that it is one 
and the same entity (the property of impenetrability) that simultaneously 
occupies two disjoint spatial locations. So we have a situation at hand 
where there are two entities, in this case material objects, in different 
locations and a third entity, in this case a universal, in both of these 
locations. 
Now, let us make a further, prima facie plausible assumption: “having the 
same spatial location” is an equivalence relation (reflexive, symmetric 
and transitive). On this assumption, it is not only that the universal 
impenetrability is simultaneously located where the balls are; it is also the 
case that the balls simultaneously have the same location as 
impenetrability (because of the symmetry of ‘having the same spatial 
location’). So one ball is located where impenetrability is located and 
impenetrability is located where the other ball is located. By the 
transitivity of ‘having the same spatial location’, the two balls have the 
same spatial location at the time t under consideration. However, ex 
hypothesi, the two balls have different locations at t. We have a 
contradiction.  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Ehring’s (2002) strategy is to refute the view, inherent in SIR, that a 
universal can be multi-located by giving an example which illustrates the 
problem of local external relations: 
U and V are each instantiated twice at [time] t, once each at the 
North and the South Pole, perfectly overlapping at each Pole. U at 
the North Pole is north of V at the South Pole and U at the South 
Pole is not north of V at the North Pole. (Ehring 2002, 21) 
This scenario constitutes a problem for multi-location of universals, 
because U would be both north of V and not north of V at t, which is 
contradictory. Now, it is time for some clarifying comments on Lowe’s 
and Ehring’s arguments. On the face of it, they are simple and 
straightforward reductio arguments. However, they do involve 
assumptions that call for discussion in terms of the contemporary theory 
of location. 
Both arguments rely on cases in which a universal is assumed to have the 
same location as another entity—in Lowe’s case a material object, in 
Ehring’s another universal. For Lowe’s argument to work, SIR must be 
seen as admitting the metaphysical possibility that a universal has exactly 
the same location as a material object that instantiates it. This, in turn, 
requires that the location of the universal, and that of the instantiating 
object, be considered as exact location. For the present purposes, exact 
spatial location can be characterized as follows: a is exactly located at b 
if and only if a has the same size, shape, and spatial relations to other 
things as does b.  Exact location is required instead of merely weak 2
location (a being weakly located at b if and only if b is not completely 
free of a), since the relation ‘having the same location as’ is thought of 
here as predicable—truly or falsely—of the two balls, as well as of each 
ball and the property of impenetrability. This presupposes that the entities 
in question have exact locations, since if they only had weak locations 
they could not occupy the same (unique) location. 
Contrary to Lowe’s argument, Ehring’s does not presuppose that it is 
possible that a universal has the same exact location as an object that 
instantiates it. Ehring’s argument can also be reformulated so as not to 
require that the universals in question have exact locations. Let us say we 
have two instantiations of U and one of V, so that with respect to some 
observer one instantiation of U is to the left of the instantiation of V and 
the other instantiation of U is not. Here, U both is and is not to the left of 
V (with respect to the observer’s position). All this requires is that the 
regions where the instantiations are (weakly) located be disjoint.  
60
 For a more detailed discussion of the notion of exact location, see (Parsons 2007, 203; 2
Gilmore 2014). In the context of the present discussion, it is important that the notion of 
exact location employed not rule out multilocation per definitionem.
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However, as far as we can tell, Ehring’s original argument does require 
that the universals have exact locations. Furthermore, the idea of a 
spatially located object lacking an exact location is controversial in any 
case.  Hence, we will from now on assume that the notion of multi-3
located universals, central to SIR, is that of multiply exactly located 
universals. Thus, if we write “Lxy” for “x is exactly located at y” and 
“Ux” for “x is a universal”, we can formalize “It is possible that there are 
multiply located universals” as 
(1)  ◊∃x∃y∃z (Ux ∧ Lxy ∧ Lxz ∧ y ≠ z), 
where the notion of possibility is to be understood as metaphysical. 
What the status of (1) should be in a formalization of SIR is not one of 
our present concerns. Moreover, we do not wish to claim that (1) 
captures, in any sense, the core of SIR as a metaphysical doctrine. We 
take it that commitment to the truth of SIR in some way involves 
commitment to the truth of (1). And the arguments against and the 
defence of SIR currently under discussion, concern the truth of (1). 
Lowe’s and Ehring’s strategy is to show that (1) leads to a contradiction; 
the purpose of Gilmore’s defence of SIR is that once we get the structure 
of spatial relations correct, (1) does not lead to a contradiction and hence 
SIR is saved from reductios like Lowe’s and Ehring’s. !
3. Gilmore’s 2n proposal !
In response to Ehring’s argument, Gilmore (2003) formulates and defends 
a novel conception of spatial relations he calls “the 2n proposal”, 
according to which spatial relations that are prima facie n-placed are 
really 2n-placed. Given the truth of the 2n proposal, (1) does not lead to 
contradiction in the way Lowe and Ehring argue. 
Gilmore claims that, at least in the case of universals, a spatial relation 
such as ‘x is north of y’ is, contrary to appearance and to common belief , 4
not two- but four-placed: ‘x, at its location Lx, is north of y, at its location  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 For example, Parsons’ (2007, 205) formal theory intended to capture the conceptual 3
truths about location contains Exactness as a theorem: “Everything that is anywhere has 
an exact location”. Parsons considers this theorem “extremely plausible”. It is the 
Functionality theorem, the view that exact location is unique, that is in tension with multi-
location (Gilmore 2014, sect. 6).
 We admit to being ignorant as to how widely held the “n-placed view”, that for example 4
‘x is north of y’ is a two-placed relation, is. To resolve this question would be an empirical 
task. However, we understand Gilmore as taking the n-placed view to be the common, 
majority conception, since he takes it without further ado as the starting point of his 
discussion, without any reference to particular “n-placed theorists”, and presents his 2n 
proposal as a better, alternative conception. Furthermore, we do not wish to embrace any 
particular explanation of why the n-placed view appears (to us, and presumably to many 
others as well, at least prior to the publication of Gilmore’s paper) as the right one.
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Ly’. Hence, according to Gilmore’s proposal a spatial relation, at least 
one between universals, contains an extra argument place for the spatial 
location of each relatum. Given the truth of the 2n conception of spatial 
relations, it is easy to see that while U, the North Pole, V, and the South 
Pole (in that order) do stand in the relation ‘x at Lx is north of y at Ly’, U, 
the South Pole, V, and the North Pole (in that order) do not (Gilmore 
2003, 423). Gilmore goes on to show that his 2n proposal provides a 
solution to any possible case illustrative of the problem of local external 
relations. Hence, given the 2n conception of spatial relations, we can 
accept SIR and, with it, (1), without falling into the contradiction pointed 
out by Ehring. 
It is easy to see how the 2n proposal, if true, would also work as part of 
an answer to Lowe’s critique of SIR. Call the exact location of one of the 
balls (ball1) “L1” and that of the other (ball2) “L2”. Given the 2n 
conception, a crucial step in the argument is revealed as a non sequitur, 
occurring as a result of an equivocation caused by an inadequate 
understanding of the structure of spatial relations, in this case of the 
relation of having the same location. Although impenetrability at L1 has 
the same location as ball1 (at L1), ball2 (at L2) does not have the same 
location as impenetrability at L1; it has the same location as 
impenetrability at L2. The transitivity of the relation of having the same 
location still holds, but once we adopt the 2n conception, we must 
consider the relata as sequences consisting of entities (which may 
themselves be locations) and their locations. Now, abbreviating “has the 
same location as” with “R”, we see that there is no middle term b that 
would allow us to take the transitivity step from aRb and bRc to aRc.  
Gilmore anticipates and replies to three objections to his 2n proposal. In 
what follows, we shall only discuss Gilmore’s reply to the second 
objection, in order to focus on two different, alternative versions of the 2n 
proposal Gilmore puts on offer. In the next section, we shall argue that 
neither version of the proposal works in defence of SIR in the present 
dialectical context. 
What Gilmore is defending, and what he and Ehring take to be required 
by SIR is the non-derivativist view of the spatial relations between 
universals. The non-derivativist view is that spatial relations between 
universals are metaphysically primitive, hence not in any sense derivative 
or based on facts or entities of some other kind, say, the spatial relations 
between the particulars that instantiate these universals. Ehring (2002, 
18) states that his argument against multi-location of universals is 
directed only at non-derivativist views of their spatial relations. One of 
the difficulties here is how to understand the notion of something’s being 
derivative on something else; Ehring does not tell us much about this. He 
puts the matter in terms of “literalness”: In contrast to non-derivativism, 
derivativist views say that universals do not literally stand in spatial 
relations.  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On a derivativist view, when we say for example that one universal is a 
certain distance from another, this is just “short for saying that a certain 
pair of objects instantiate those universals and those instantiating objects 
are that distance from each other” (ibid.).  Hence, according to 5
derivativism the spatial relation of distance between the universals is not 
metaphysically primitive but derivative on something else, for example 
on the corresponding spatial relation between the instantiating particulars.  
This is really all that can legitimately be said about the derivativism−non-
derivativism distinction on the basis of Ehring’s and Gilmore’s 
discussions. In short, non-derivativism is the view that universals stand in 
spatial relations, period; derivativism is the view that universals stand in 
spatial relations in virtue of some further facts that are not facts of 
universals standing in spatial relations. What is left undetermined is how 
we should understand, in terms of contemporary analytic metaphysics, 
the notions “in virtue of”, “metaphysically primitive”, and “derivative”. 
One possible way of framing this distinction would be in terms of 
metaphysical grounding (e.g. Fine 2012; Correia 2013). The general idea 
in this case would be that the obtaining of facts of specific sort—
universals standing in spatial relations—are determined (in a way to be 
further specified) by the obtaining of facts of another, more fundamental 
sort—for example, instantiating objects standing in spatial relations. 
What is supposed to distinguish SIR from weak immanent realism is the 
view that universals are concrete, hence spatiotemporal. If a 
metaphysician claimed adherence to SIR while at the same time 
accepting derivativism, she would have to face the pressing question, 
what distinguishes her form of realism from weak immanent realism. 
Putting the issue in terms of Ehring’s (somewhat vague) notion of 
literalness, if the alleged strongly immanent universals do not literally 
occupy spatial locations, why take these universals as concrete instead of 
abstract? A weak immanent realist can also say that universals do occupy 
locations, but only in the derivative sense that the instantiating objects do.  
We do not attempt to argue in this paper that no view that could 
justifiably be classified as derivativist in the general sense discussed 
above would be compatible with SIR. We only wish to make two points. 
First, the Ehring-Gilmore dialectic currently at issue is predicated on the 
assumption that derivativist views are not serious options for the defender 
of concrete universals. In the present paper, we shall also proceed under 
this assumption, common to both sides of the debate we are evaluating. 
Second, derivativism is not obviously compatible with SIR; compatibility 
would have to be evaluated vis-à-vis the details of each particular deriva-  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about a linguistic issue of what statements mean, this is clearly not the case. Derivativism 
and non-derivativism are described by Ehring in otherwise squarely metaphysical terms, 
as concerning the spatial relations between entities instead of spatial relation talk.
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-tivist view. Perhaps there could be a coherent variant of SIR that 
incorporates derivativism. However, we are not aware of such a variant, 
nor in the business of developing one ourselves. 
One of the objections to the 2n solution that Gilmore considers is that it 
makes the spatial relations of universals derivative from the spatial 
relations between locations, and hence turns out to be a form of 
derivativism after all. 
Gilmore responds to this objection by considering two versions of the 2n 
analysis of spatial relations. The unrestricted analysis applies to all spatial 
relations. According to the unrestricted version, even the relation “L is 
two feet from L′”, where L and L′ are locations, is, despite appearances, a 
four-place one: “L at L is two feet from L′ at L′”. This version of the 2n 
analysis relativizes spatial relations between locations to those very 
locations. This version avoids the above mentioned objection because 
locations are spatially related in the same location relative way as 
universals are. The second version of the 2n analysis would then be the 
restricted one: The spatial relations between locations on one hand and 
between universals on the other are different in nature. Locations are 
spatially related to each other simpliciter, without further relativization to 
locations (that is, to themselves) whereas universals are spatially related 
to each other only as relativized to their locations in the way laid out by 
the 2n proposal. However, rather than admitting that the latter way of 
being spatially related would be derivative from the former, Gilmore 
insists that the two ways are “equally fundamental and equally 
genuine” (2003, 426). !
4. SIR and the 2n Proposal !
Before moving on to our arguments against Gilmore’s 2n proposal, it is in 
order to briefly clarify the dialectical situation at hand. First of all, we 
wish to point out that in the present context Gilmore could not argue in 
favor of the 2n proposal along the following lines: 
P1 SIR is a true theory. 
P2 If a theory T is true, T is coherent. 
P3 The 2n proposal, in its restricted or unrestricted form, 
 is the only viable response to Ehring’s (and Lowe’s) 
 argument to the effect that SIR is not coherent. 
C  The 2n proposal, in its restricted or unrestricted form, 
 is true. 
Let’s call this argument A. There is of course nothing wrong with A per 
se. We do not wish to claim A would be invalid, were Gilmore to offer it. 
But he does not offer it, and for a good reason. In the present dialectical 
context, the truth of SIR is the moot point. Surely, there are theoretical  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motivations for adopting SIR having to do with metaphysical explanatory 
power, for example the possibility of explaining causation in terms of 
universals (e.g. Armstrong 1997, 204ff.); and no serious ontological 
theory should be expected to be completely free of problems. However, at 
the present state of discussion SIR has faced serious objections, ones that, 
if true, would amount to an outright refutation of SIR by reductio ad 
absurdum. So, whatever the explanatory benefits a metaphysician may be 
allowed to expect from SIR, she will not be entitled to adopt SIR unless 
she can somehow verify that it is not incoherent in the way its critics—
Lowe and Ehring—have laid out. 
In accordance with this situation, Gilmore does not argue in favor of the 
2n proposal on the grounds that SIR is true. Rather, he is offering the 2n 
proposal as a further theoretical view, one about the metaphysics of 
spatial relations, and argues that if the 2n proposal is true, SIR need not 
be a complete dead end as a result of Lowe’s and Ehring’s incoherence 
arguments. And Gilmore does think the 2n proposal is true; our aim is to 
show that he does not give us sufficient reason for thinking so.  
Instead of A, Gilmore’s argument is better schematized as A*: 
P*1 If the 2n proposal is true, then Ehring’s (and Lowe’s) 
 argument fails to establish that SIR is not coherent. 
P*2 If Ehring’s (and Lowe’s) argument fails to establish 
 that SIR is not coherent, then we have no reason to 
 assume that SIR is not coherent. 
P*3 The 2n proposal is true. 
P*4 Ehring’s (and Lowe’s) argument fails to establish that 
 SIR is not coherent. (From P*1-P*3) 
C* We have no reason to assume that SIR is not coherent. 
 (From P*4 and P*2) 
We do not contest the validity of A* nor the truth of the premises P*1 and 
P*2. What we do contest is Gilmore’s entitlement to assert P*3 and hence 
the justification he gives for P*4 and C*. We will not attempt to argue 
that the 2n proposal is not true, only that Gilmore does not give us 
sufficient grounds to adopt it in favor of the more common and intuitive 
conception of spatial relations as n-placed (for example, of ‘two feet 
from’ as two-placed). In what follows, it is important to keep in mind 
why A is a question-begging argumentative strategy in the present 
context: Gilmore’s purpose is to clear SIR of the grave incoherence 
objections by arguing that the 2n proposal is true. His purpose is not, and 
in this dialectical context cannot justifiably be, to argue that the 2n 
proposal is true on the grounds that SIR is in fact true regardless of the 
standing objections. In brief, Gilmore cannot appeal to the independent 
plausibility or truth of SIR in his argumentation in favor of the 2n propo-  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-sal, since the proposal is specifically introduced to alleviate the worry 
that SIR may be incoherent. Now that we have made the dialectical 
context clear, we can proceed to our critique of Gilmore’s argument for 
the 2n proposal and hence for P*4 and C*. 
As regards the restricted version of the 2n analysis, Gilmore notes that an 
advocate of this version does have the option of treating the spatial 
relations between universals as derivative from the spatial relations of 
their locations, but that nothing forces this option on her, since she is able 
to say that the two different ways of being spatially related are equally 
fundamental. This is the only argument we are given in favour of the 
restricted 2n. 
However, it does not suffice here to simply insist, without argument, that 
the two ways are “equally fundamental”. If universals can be two feet 
apart only as relative to their locations which are two feet apart in a non-
relative way, the insistence of equal fundamentality loses credibility. 
First, in the absence of further details and argument, we are left 
wondering why there should be two different, equally fundamental ways 
of being two feet apart. Certainly this is not obvious and not a widely 
endorsed view in the metaphysics of spatial relations and locations. Even 
if Gilmore provided us with a satisfactory answer, we would still be left 
wondering why universals should be among those entities that can be two 
feet apart only in the relative sense. This latter question cannot be 
answered by insisting “because universals, being spatiotemporal and 
multiply instantiable, are capable of being multi-located”.  
Second, we are left without a clue as to what the relevant notions of 
fundamentality and relativity are supposed to be. If they were, what looks 
the most plausible option in this context, metaphysical notions, it is very 
difficult to see how these two ways of being spatially related could be 
equally fundamental. For if locations are among those types of entities 
which can be two feet apart without this fact being grounded in the fact 
that entities of some other category are so related spatially, and if 
universals can be two feet apart only in virtue of entities of another 
category (locations) being so related, then the insistence about equal 
fundamentality looks out of place. This way of putting the matter requires 
that we read “fundamental” and “relative to” in terms of grounding: facts 
A are more fundamental than facts B if and only if B’s are grounded in 
(facts that are grounded in) A’s and ultimately to whatever A’s are 
grounded in (if A’s are grounded); and B’s obtain only as relative to the 
obtaining of A’s if and only if B’s are grounded in A’s. Admittedly, this 
may not be the only plausible metaphysical reading of the relevant 
notions , but the notions of fundamentality and relativity at play do 6
suggest it.  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On the other hand, if the notions of fundamentality and relativity were 
not to be understood in a metaphysical sense but rather in some 
conceptual-linguistic sense, then we must admit to having no idea what 
the basis of the claim of equal fundamentality could be. For the concept 
of being two feet apart intuitively seems to be a constituent of the concept 
of being two feet apart relative to some other entities being two feet apart, 
but not the other way around. The claim that a proper constituent a of 
concept b would be equally fundamental as b itself in some conceptual, 
linguistic, or semantic sense would need to be backed by a detailed 
theory and argument, which Gilmore does not give us. 
Since we are not given guidelines as to how the relevant notions of 
fundamentality and relativity should be understood, we shall not 
speculate further on the issue. We have not tried to establish the sweeping 
conclusion that the two ways of being two feet apart cannot be equally 
fundamental in any possible sense. The purpose of our discussion has 
been to point out that the proponent of SIR who opts for the restricted 
version of the 2n analysis is not justified in simply insisting the 
relativized and the non-relativized ways of being spatially related are 
equally fundamental. Gilmore, however, seems to think so since he gives 
us no account of how and why they should be considered equally 
fundamental—this insistence of equal fundamentality is merely an ad hoc 
move to save the restricted 2n from derivativism. Pace this insistence, the 
restricted 2n, on a metaphysical reading, is just a form of derivativism: 
universals can stand in a spatial relation only in virtue of entities of 
another category (locations) standing in that spatial relation. 
The unrestricted version of the 2n proposal is introduced to avoid this 
worry about derivativism and the accompanying problems about 
fundamentality and relativity. It says explicitly that “the most 
fundamental way” (Gilmore 2003, 426) in which any entities, locations 
included, can be two feet apart is relative to locations. In particular, for 
two locations L and L′ to be two feet apart is for L at L to be two feet 
from L′ at L′. Gilmore (ibid., 425) says that he sees no reason to deny that 
each spatial location is located at itself—he apparently considers this way 
of speaking of locations being located at themselves unproblematic. 
From the point of view of everyday discourse, talk of a location being 
located (at itself or at any location) seems strained. However, its being 
strained or unfamiliar does not, of course, constitute a reason to deny that 
each spatial location is located, or even a reason to condemn this way of 
speaking as senseless or confused in the technical context of 
metaphysical inquiry. The view that the 2n proposal applies to locations 
as well as the entities that are commonly thought to occupy locations 
needs to be assessed by its theoretical merits. Nevertheless, we might 
want to say that the view is not very intuitive. Moreover, it is perhaps 
safe to say that it is far from being a majority view among 
metaphysicians. Neither of these observations per se count against the  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unrestricted 2n proposal. They just draw attention to the fact that it might 
not be justifiable to adopt it purely by default—rather, such adoption 
would need rational support. 
One way of providing such support would be to point out that adopting 
the unrestricted 2n as part of our metaphysics would have certain purely 
theoretical, top-to-bottom virtues, such as making the theory more 
elegant, simple, or unified. If a metaphysician gave this kind of argument 
in favor of the unrestricted 2n, she would probably think it does not make 
any metaphysical difference, at the level of ontology, whether or not we 
say that locations are located. We could stipulate either way, and the 
stipulation could be evaluated, if at all, by considering its theoretical 
virtues. Indeed, Parsons (2007, 224) states that there is no metaphysical 
difference between thinking that locations are located at themselves and 
thinking that locations are not located at all. Parsons claims that thinking 
either way is just a matter of stipulation. 
However, the present discussion shows that the adoption of the 
unrestricted 2n does have potential for making a metaphysical difference. 
Let us assume that the restricted and the unrestricted forms of the 2n 
proposal exhaust the options, as Gilmore seems to do. If a proponent of 
SIR wishes to save SIR from Lowe’s and Ehring’s arguments by adopting 
the 2n conception of spatial relations, and if the restricted version of 2n is 
ruled out (for example because it turns out to be derivativist), then our 
proponent of SIR is left with the unrestricted version. Thus, from the 
point of view of the contemporary debate about universals, the view that 
locations are located is far from lacking metaphysical significance. 
So, given the current state of the play, one cannot just stipulate on the 
issue. Serious metaphysical argument is required. Gilmore does not 
present any such argument, aside from offering the unrestricted version as 
an alternative to the restricted one, and saying (without argument) that he 
sees no reason to deny that locations are located at themselves. 
Bracketing considerations having to do with SIR, we should note that we 
already have a perfectly acceptable view of the structure of spatial 
relations, one that also comports with everyday intuitions (should we 
wish to give weight to everyday intuitions in metaphysics): the “n-
placed” view of spatial relations, according to which being two feet apart, 
for instance, is a two-placed relation. Against the background of what has 
been just said, the 2n view of the structure of spatial relations should 
come with strong motivating reasons. In the absence of such reasons, it is 
hard to see why we should think that spatial relations between locations 
have the more complex structure expressed by “L at L is two feet from L′ 
at L′” instead of the more simple one expressed by “L is two feet from L
´”. Even if we gave no weight to common sense intuitions in 
metaphysics, perhaps considerations of theoretical simplicity and 
redundancy might, ceteris paribus, come into play here.  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It should be kept in mind that, as explained at the beginning of this 
section, the fact that the 2n proposal, on either version, supports SIR 
cannot in this context be accepted as a reason for adopting the 2n 
proposal. One would need reasons independent of SIR. It seems to us that 
Gilmore’s only rationale for adopting the unrestricted 2n view of the 
structure of spatial relations is to save multi-location of universals, and 
hence SIR, from Ehring’s critique, in the event that the restricted version 
of the view should be deemed unacceptable or lacking sufficient rational 
support. Hence, should the need to go unrestricted arise for Gilmore, the 
2n view would be completely ad hoc: Gilmore gives us no reasons for 
replacing the common sense “n-placed” view with the restricted version 
of the 2n view, independent of its usefulness in the defence of SIR against 
Ehring’s argument. And earlier in this section, we argued that the 
restricted version indeed lacks sufficient rational support, and is difficult 
to accept for a proponent of SIR because it seems to be a form of 
derivativism.  !
5. Conclusion !
The metaphysical possibility of multi-location of universals is central to 
SIR. Lowe and Ehring have argued that the admission of such multi-
location leads to contradiction. If Gilmore’s 2n proposal were defensible 
on grounds independent of SIR, it could be used in answering Lowe’s and 
Ehring’s reductio arguments. If, in spite of common-sense views on the 
matter, spatial relations were 2n instead of n placed in the way laid out by 
the proposal, multi-location of universals would not lead to contradiction. 
In this paper, we have argued that Gilmore has not made a convincing 
case for the 2n proposal.  
First, the restricted version of the 2n proposal stands in need of a detailed 
account of why there should be two different yet “equally fundamental” 
ways of being spatially related, namely the relativized and the non-
relativized way, and why universals are among those entities which can 
be spatially related in the former but not the latter way. Furthermore, 
Gilmore’s insistence on equal fundamentality seems but an ad hoc 
attempt to mask a derivativist position about the location of universals. 
And derivativism, in turn, is not considered an option for a proponent of 
SIR by either side of the debate.  
Second, adopting the unrestricted form of the 2n proposal would mean 
accepting the view that all prima facie n-placed spatial relations are really 
2n placed, involving locations as relata, and hence that locations 
themselves are located. In section 4 we pointed out that whether or not 
we consider locations as located is not a mere matter of stipulation; given 
the current situation in discussion on the metaphysics of universals, the 
unrestricted 2n proposal might well be needed to support SIR against 
Lowe’s and Ehring’s critique. Hence the view that locations are located  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does have ontological import. Moreover, since we already have the 
common sense “n-placed” view of spatial relations, it is surely the case 
that the unrestricted 2n proposal cannot be established by mere 
stipulation. To repeat, being compatible with SIR is not in this context to 
be cited as a reason for accepting the 2n proposal, in either its restricted 
or unrestricted form. But Gilmore gives us no argument in favor of the 
unrestricted form of the 2n proposal, aside from the fact that it is, unlike 
the regular “n-placed” view, compatible with the multi-location of 
universals. Hence, as things stand, the unrestricted 2n is simply an ad hoc 
move to save SIR from Ehring’s incoherence argument. 
We have argued that Gilmore’s 2n proposal currently lacks sufficient 
rational support in order to be utilized in a counterargument to Lowe’s 
and Ehring’s reductios against SIR. We conclude that since the supporters 
of SIR have not adequately answered Lowe’s and Ehring’s arguments, 
SIR remains under the threat of incoherence. Therefore, in the current 
situation, we should be motivated to look for an alternative answer to the 
problem of universals. Prima facie, weak immanent realism does better in 
this respect and it is, indeed, the view endorsed by many metaphysicians 
including Lowe himself. According to it, immanent universals are rather 
abstract than concrete, i.e. they are not located in space-time even if their 
concrete instances are. Another alternative would be nominalism, for 
example a trope theory as proposed in (Keinänen 2011).  7!!
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